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Applying Heuristics and Biases More
Broadly and Cautiously
Abraham P. Schwab, Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne
In the target article “Biases and Heuristics in Decision
Making and Their Impact on Autonomy,” Blumenthal-
Barby (2016) contributes to ongoing attempts to answer a
fundamental question: How should we (re)think about
patient autonomy in light of our increasing understanding
of the limits of human judgment? She outlines a frame-
work cordoning off understanding, intentionality, and
alienation as areas where patient autonomy may be chal-
lenged by the biases of judgment. When biases undermine
patient understanding, the threat to autonomy is direct
and serious—the possibility of informed consent is chal-
lenged. When biases undermine intentionality, the
patient’s judgment is dictated by (or, alternatively para-
lyzed by) bias. Finally, when biases control or alienate a
patient as decision-maker, the patient feels as though a
decision is not theirs—“it was the ‘bias talking’” (Blumen-
thal-Barby 2016, 12). Here again, the possibility of consent
is challenged.
In this commentary, I offer two strategies for expand-
ing and applying this framework.1 First, the application of
the heuristics and biases approach warrants expansion to
include practitioner judgment.2 The likely biases of practi-
tioner decision making threaten patient autonomy as well.
Second, the conclusions of cognitive psychology warrant a
more thorough critical appraisal, both on their own merits
and in application to the medical setting. Valuable as the
heuristics and biases approach may be for rethinking
autonomy, there are real risks of unwarranted application.
PRACTITIONER JUDGMENT AND PATIENT
AUTONOMY
As Blumenthal-Barby demonstrates through numerous
examples, the way that physicians present information
and recommendations to patients can bias patient under-
standing. By focusing narrowly on the biases of patient
judgment, one might assume that the understanding and
recommendations of practitioners are unbiased. One rea-
son to take this view is the practitioner’s expertise. As the
products of specialized and rigorous training, the
practitioners’ judgment should be better than the judg-
ment of a lay person. And it will be in many cases. But the
evidence that expert judgment is also subject to cognitive
biases is robust (Koehler, Brenner, and Griffin 2002) and
worthy of investigation (Schwab 2008). These biases can
lead practitioners to misunderstand the situation (much as
a patient might), and even when there is no misunder-
standing, these biases can lead practitioners to make
biased recommendations.
Take, for example, the bias of overconfidence. As Bau-
mann, Deber, and Thompson (1991) demonstrated
(and Berner and Graber [2008] reiterate), practitioner
understanding can be biased by overconfidence. In the
Baumann, Deber, and Thompson study, practitioners con-
fronted with similar cases recommended incompatible
treatments with high degrees of confidence. On the indi-
vidual level, these practitioners were certain their recom-
mendation was the right one, but the recommendations
across individual practitioners were incompatible. This
kind of study demonstrates that practitioners may misun-
derstand the implications of a patient’s medical condition.
This misunderstanding, then, gets passed on to the patient
when patients are informed of a diagnosis, prognosis, or
recommendations. Even if the patient accurately under-
stands everything the practitioner presents, the patient’s
final judgment will be biased by the practitioner’s
misunderstanding.
Additionally, practitioners may introduce bias when
evaluating their (accurate) understanding of a patient’s
condition. Take, for example, a study by Redelmeier and
Shafer (1995) that showed how introducing a second, but
equivalent, medication into a physician’s decision matrix
led some physicians to make a different recommendation.
The choice between no treatment and one possibly effec-
tive treatment and the choice between no treatment and
two similar possibly effective treatments should produce
similar recommendations by practitioners. But Redelmeier
and Shafer (1995) found that in the latter case, more physi-
cians recommended no treatment. Even if practitioners
Address correspondence to Abraham P. Schwab, Philosophy Department, Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne, 2101 E
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1. It seems that more could be done to distinguish concerns about intentionality and concerns about alienation/controlling influence. As
written, these appear to be two sides of the same coin—the biases of human judgment alienate or control, thereby undermining the pos-
sibility of patient intentionality. For this commentary, however, this concern can be set aside. The critiques offered here are indifferent to
this distinction.
2. I favor the term “practitioner” over “physician,” as a term inclusive of all the medical professionals making judgments about patient
care.
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accurately understand the medical situation and its impli-
cations, the effect of unconscious bias may lead to recom-
mendations out of line with those understandings and the
patient’s best interests.
In an indirect but substantive way, the biases of practi-
tioner judgment can undermine patient autonomy. Impor-
tantly, these threats to patient autonomy may be more
substantial than the patient’s own bias. When the
practitioner’s bias infects the presentation of information
to patients, no strategy for debiasing patient judgment will
debias the final decision.
APPLICATION IN MEDICAL PRACTICE
One of the key insights of the heuristics and biases
approach is that the background conditions of human
judgment have significant, but unconscious, affects on
judgment. But the predictable biases in judgment will
affect different decision makers differently depending on
the background conditions in play. For example, the ease
of recalling similar experiences opens the door for bias.
But not all background conditions are the same. Different
decision makers have different examples that are easy to
recall. Patients with chronic diseases may rely on their per-
sonal experiences, while the infrequent patient may rely
on the representations of medicine in popular culture. Fur-
ther, even when robust evidence supports the existence of
a particular bias in general, the bias may be not applicable
in medical practice. For example, there remains some dis-
agreement about the effects of sunk costs on physician
judgment. Eisenberg et al. (2012) argue for continued
attention despite the Bornstein, Emler, and Chapman
(1999) demonstration that medical residents are not subject
to it. While I prefer Bornstein’s empirical evidence to
Eisenberg’s theorizing, a single study on medical residents
requires supplemental evidence to support the conclusion
that sunk costs do not affect practitioner judgment.
Accordingly, the effects of heuristics and biases on
patient autonomy requires continued field testing. While
the evidence of bias in human judgment remains generally
robust, evidence of any particular bias or set of biases in
the medical setting requires clear and specific evidentiary
support before steps to address their effects should be con-
sidered. Doing otherwise risks undue application and
missed opportunities.
REPRODUCIBILITY: A WORD OF CAUTION
Within the last few years, psychologists have become
increasingly concerned with the reproducibility of the
results published in their field. As Ionnadis put it, the cur-
rent pressure to publish without similar efforts at reproduc-
tion risks mixing “unconfirmed genuine discoveries and
unchallenged fallacies” (Ioannidis 2012, 649). These con-
cerns have led to large, collaborative attempts to reproduce
or recreate the published conclusions of pscyhological sci-
ence. Starting in 2012, the Open Science Collaboration
(2012) began evaluating studies from top-tier journals in
psychology. To the degree possible, it attempted to recre-
ate the conditions of the initial experiment and tried to
reproduce the same conclusion. The results were discour-
aging (Open Science Collaboration 2015). Of the pub-
lished results they attempted to reproduce, about 4 in 10
were successful.3 Failing to reproduce 60% of the conclu-
sions in a separate experiment casts doubt on the applica-
bility or validity of the initial conclusion.4 Accordingly,
efforts to apply the biases should be cautiously discern-
ing. The conclusion that human judgment involves heu-
ristics and biases has been robustly demonstrated, but not
every single bias discussed in the literature shares that
robust support.
Blumenthal-Barby’s framework is a valuable contribu-
tion and may move forward the dialogue about respecting
patient autonomy given the constraints of human judg-
ment. My concerns about the effective application of this
framework would be addressed by more substantive atten-
tion to the effects of practitioner bias on patient autonomy
and a research program that cautiously applies the conclu-
sions of cognitive psychology within the specific circum-
stances of medical decision-making. &
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Pre-Authorization: A Novel Decision-
Making Heuristic That May Promote
Autonomy
Fay Niker, University of Warwick
Peter B. Reiner, University of British Columbia
Gidon Felsen, University of Colorado School of Medicine
While the nature of autonomy has been debated for centu-
ries, recent scholarship has been reexamining our concep-
tion(s) of autonomy in light of findings from the
behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences (Felsen and
Reiner 2011; Blumenthal-Barby 2016). Blumenthal-Barby’s
(2016) target article provides us with a timely and helpful
framework for thinking about this issue in a systematic
way, specifically in relation to the wide range of cognitive
biases and heuristics that we employ in our decision mak-
ing. Building on this, we wish to expand the framework
beyond the article’s focus on the threat posed by biases
and heuristics by suggesting that it is possible for at least
some heuristics to promote autonomy. We hope to demon-
strate this point by introducing the conceptual framework
for a novel heuristic that we call pre-authorization.
Blumenthal-Barby argues that biases and heuristics
“pose a serious threat to autonomous decision making and
human agency” and that, consequently, efforts should be
made to remove, mitigate, or counter them. While recog-
nizing the autonomy-threatening potential of these “fast
thinking” mechanisms, as well as agreeing with the author
about the types of cases in which this potential is likely to
be actualized, we suggest that it does not capture the full
range of interactions that are relevant to a balanced assess-
ment of their impact on autonomy. If, as is widely
acknowledged, at least some heuristics are adaptive
responses to particular real-world decision-making situa-
tions (Gigerenzer 2008), the issue at hand becomes eluci-
dating whether, and under what conditions, the cognitive
influence of any particular heuristic is autonomy-threaten-
ing, autonomy-preserving, or even autonomy-promoting.
Blumenthal-Barby focuses on the first of these categories;
with respect to the “component of absence of controlling
or alienating influence,” (8) she contends that if the per-
son’s attitude toward the influence is one of feeling con-
trolled or alienated from her decision on account of the
workings of a cognitive bias or heuristic, her autonomy is
diminished.
We agree with Blumenthal-Barby’s (2016) recognition
that “the relevant question for judgments of autonomous
action is the person’s attitude toward the influence that is lead-
ing that person toward one decision or action or another”
(8, emphasis added). But what does it mean to have an
attitude toward an influence? When an influence is entirely
alienating or controlling, one can reasonably adopt an atti-
tude of rejection, lest one’s decisions be influenced unduly
by forces that we deem inappropriate. But in navigating
our lives, we sometimes welcome certain influences, and
under those circumstances there seems to be little threat to
meaningful autonomy. So what is different about the influ-
ence that is welcomed from the one that is resisted? We
suggest one solution: that the extent to which the source of
an influence is pre-authorized critically determines how it
affects autonomy. We have been studying this idea within
the context of investigating the welcome or unwelcome
nature of socio-relational influences upon people’s atti-
tudes about autonomy, but it also has implications for
thinking about the effects of cognitive biases and heuristics
on autonomy more generally.
We understand pre-authorization as a process by
which an individual gives a certain agent preferential
access to influencing her decision-making processes. Com-
monly, pre-authorization occurs before a specific decision
is made, and usually for decisions about which certain
Address correspondence to Gidon Felsen, Department of Physiology and Biophysics, University of Colorado School of Medicine, 12800
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